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High- and low-IQ children in the first, third, and fifth grades performed two 
free-recall tasks: a sort-recall task with sets of categorically related pictures, and a 
class-recall task, with children recalling the current members of their school class. 
All children were deemed to be experts concerning the composition of their school 
class, but, unlike experts in other domains, had no special motivation associated 
with their expertise. Recall and clustering on both tasks were high. The high-IQ 
children performed better than low-IQ children only on the sort-recall task. IQ was 
significantly correlated with measures of performance on the sort-recall task but 
not on the class-recall task. The results reflect the fact that the memory benefits 
associated with being an expert (here, elimination of IQ effects) are related to the 
greater knowledge the expert possesses and not to factors of motivation. D 1992 
Academic Press. Inc. 
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Older children, having greater content knowledge for the to-be- 
remembered information, expend less mental effort in retrieving individ- 
ual items from long-term memory and more easily implement memory 
strategies, relative to younger children. Differences in knowledge base 
have also been hypothesized to be a major source of individual differ- 
ences in memory (see Muir-Broaddus & Bjorklund, 1990; Schneider, 
Korkel & Weinert, 1989, 1990). One very fruitful area of research con- 
cerning individual differences in memory performance as a function of 
differences in knowledge base has concentrated on differences between 
experts and novices in particular domains (e.g., Chi, 1978; Voss, 
Vesonder, & Spilich, 1980). Experts in an area display greater retention 
of relevant information than nonexperts, although they do not differ from 
novices in areas unrelated to their expertise. In fact, in one much cited 
study (Chi, 1978), chess-expert children displayed greater memory span 
for chess positions than a group of adults, although the pattern of results 
was reversed when digits were used as stimuli (see also Opwis, Gold, 
Gruber, & Schneider, 1990). 
This expert/novice paradigm has been expanded upon by assessing the 
memory of children with different levels of expertise orthogonal to indices 
of their intelligence. For example, Schneider ef al. (1989, 1990) classified 
third, fifth, and seventh grade children as soccer experts or novices. 
Assessments were also made of children’s academic performance (IQ 
scores and school grades), permitting them to classify subjects as suc- 
cessful or unsuccessful learners. This yielded four distinct groups: soccer 
experts/successful learners; soccer experts/unsuccessful learners; soccer 
novices/successful learners; and soccer novices/unsuccessful learners. 
Children from each group were read a story about soccer and later 
asked a series of memory and comprehension questions about the pas- 
sage. The most striking aspect of their results was that, at each grade 
level, soccer experts remembered more about the story and showed 
greater comprehension than soccer novices, independent of learning abil- 
ity. That is, individual differences in intelligence did not contribute at all 
to differences in performance for this material. Similar findings of the 
moderating effect of knowledge on low levels of intelligence (or aptitude) 
in the retention of domain-specific information have been reported in two 
other studies assessing junior high school children’s (Recht & Leslie, 
1988) and adults’ (Walker, 1987) knowledge of baseball. In a similar vein, 
Swanson (1990) has recently reported that high metacognitive knowledge 
can compensate for low general aptitude in children’s cognitive task per- 
formance. Similar to the interpretation of knowledge base theorists, 
Swanson argues that metacognitive skill substitutes for general ability 
“by providing children with domain-specific problem-solving aptitude” 
(1990, p, 313). 
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In investigating the relationship between expertise and intelligence on 
memory performance, we do not mean to imply that psychometric intel- 
ligence is independent of content knowledge. Consistent with contempo- 
rary theories of intelligence (e.g., Ceci, 1990; Sternberg, 1983, we believe 
that what children know is an important component of intelligence, influ- 
encing how efficiently information is processed and the likelihood of ac- 
quiring new information. Yet recent research has clearly shown that low 
IQ children can develop pockets of expertise, and when they do, they 
perform in a highly competent manner on cognitive tasks dealing with 
their area of expertise. Thus, we see domain-specific knowledge as com- 
pensating for generally low psychometrically measured intelligence when 
the tasks permit children to use their detailed knowledge for problem 
solution. In such situations, children’s expertise “makes” them smart, 
reflecting, we believe, the important role that knowledge plays in “intel- 
ligent” behavior. This also suggests that the academic performance of 
low-IQ children can be enhanced when instruction is conducted (1) in a 
domain for which they have substantial knowledge or (2) in a manner 
whereby the child’s knowledge is built step by step so that he or she 
develops a substantial knowledge base with which to compensate for the 
lower IQ. 
As important as the expert/novice studies are in clarifying the relation 
between content knowledge and intelligence for retention of domain- 
specific information, there are some problems inherent with the expert/ 
novice paradigm. One usual problem, that of potential differences in in- 
telligence of experts and novices, is solved by studies such as those of 
Schneider et al. (1989, 1990) by contrasting expert groups orthogonal to 
intelligence level groups. However, the role of motivation remains an 
issue. Children (and adults) who choose to become expert at a subject 
likely are especially motivated to perform well on tasks assessing knowl- 
edge pertinent to their domain of expertise. Based on previous studies by 
Schneider and his colleagues on soccer expertise (Schneider & Bjorklund, 
1992; Schneider et al., 1989), there is clear evidence that child experts are 
more interested in and motivated to engage in tasks related to their field 
of expertise than are novices. Furthermore, there is no evidence the high- 
and low-aptitude experts differ in regard to either interest (Schneider & 
Bjorklund, 1992) or motivation (Schneider et al., 1989). In other words, 
expert children are different from nonexpert children in important ways 
other than just their knowledge base. Although there is little research 
specifically investigating this question, motivation has been theorized to 
be an important component in children’s memory performance (see 
Schneider & Pressley, 1989), with some research indicating higher levels 
of memory performance for children who are given incentives to perform 
well (e.g., Kunzinger & Witryol, 1984). 
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Research by Bjorklund and Zeman has sought to avoid this problem by 
assessing children’s memory for a domain in which all children can be 
considered as experts, namely for recall of the members of their current 
school class (Bjorklund & Bjorklund, 1985; Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982, 
1983). When tested at the end of the school year, children from the first 
grade on are highly familiar with the composition of their school class. 
Research has shown that levels of recall and clustering (based on struc- 
tures in the classroom such as seating arrangement or reading groups, or 
in terms of characteristics of the children themselves, such as sex or race) 
are high, with developmental differences being greatly reduced or elimi- 
nated. Furthermore, although most children appear to follow some clus- 
tering strategy in their recall, a majority of children of all ages tested (6 to 
11 years) are unaware of using a particular organizational scheme. 
Bjorklund and Zeman have argued that the organization observed in 
class recall reflects, for the most part, the relatively automatic activation 
of well-established relations in long-term memory and not deliberately 
implemented strategies, per se. Following the theorizing of Hasher and 
Zacks (1979), because of the automatic nature of such organization, per- 
formance should not vary with individual differences in motivation or 
intelligence. 
Children, because of their daily exposure to and involvement with 
classmates and their names, can be considered experts in the knowledge 
of the names to be recalled. Although one’s classmates are surely impor- 
tant to a child, the frequent practice, studying, and general investment of 
time associated with expertise in areas such as chess or baseball should 
not characterize children’s expertise in knowing their classmates’ names. 
Thus, there should be no special motivation to perform well in the class- 
recall task. In comparison, one hypothesis for the generally superior per- 
formance of experts relative to novices independent of aptitude, is that 
children who choose to become especially proficient in domains such as 
soccer, chess, or baseball are particularly motivated to do well on tasks 
within their area of expertise. Performance between high- and low-IQ 
children on the class-recall task can be compared with the results of other 
studies using the expert/novice paradigm, with the knowledge that pat- 
terns of performance between the high- and low-IQ children are not at- 
tributed to a special motivation typically associated with being an expert, 
If the performance differences between low- and high-IQ experts and 
nonexperts (which were found in previous expert/novice studies) were 
not due to differences in motivation, then we should find no significant 
relationships between class-recall performance and measures of IQ in the 
present study. 
Children from grades 1, 3, and 5 were administered the class-recall task 
and a sort-recall task, in which they were given a set of categorizable 
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pictures to sort into meaning-based groups and then to recall. The class- 
recall task is hypothesized to be mediated by the relatively automatic 
activation of well-established semantic memory relationships. In con- 
trast, the sort-recall task is hypothesized to involve a significant strategic 
component, with subjects actively deciding how to group items into co- 
herent categories to facilitate retrieval (see Schneider & Pressley, 1989). 
Children’s recall and clustering on sort-recall tasks when they are di- 
rected to group items according to categories is often high (see Bjorklund 
er al., 1990) and should approximate that of class recall, making compar- 
isons between the two tasks appropriate. Children were further classified 
into high-IQ or low-IQ groups. Thus, in this study, the effects of individ- 
ual differences in intelligence on memory tasks were assessed in children 
on two tasks, the class-recall task for which they could be considered 
experts, and one “standard” (sort-recall) task for which they were not 
experts. We predicted that individual differences in IQ would influence 
performance on the sort-recall task but would not significantly influence 
performance on the class-recall task. 
METHOD 
Subjects. Subjects in this experiment were 47 first graders (21 boys and 26 girls, mean age 
= 7.3 years, SD = .42 years) from five different classrooms; 54 third graders (24 boys and 
30 girls, mean age = 9.5 years, SD = .47 years) from four different classrooms; and 52 fifth 
graders (24 boys and 28 girls, mean age = 11.26 years, SD = 44 years) from four different 
classrooms. Children were selected from two public schools in south Florida. The families 
of the children represented a broad socioeconomic range, but most were from lower-middle 
to upper-middle income brackets. Children had been assigned to their classrooms at the 
beginning of the school year, approximately 8 months prior to testing. Although seating 
arrangements in each of the 13 classrooms involved in this study were not uniform, struc- 
tured arrangements were used in each classroom. 
Children were classified into high- or low-IQ groups based on a median split of IQ scores 
computed separately at each grade. For the third (low M = 104.03, SD = 9.67; high M = 
126.38, SD = 8.74) and fifth grade children (low M = 96.61, SD = 8.77; high M = 120.17, 
SD = 10.36), classifications were based on scores from the Otis-Lennon test, administered 
by the school at the end of the previous academic year. Such tests were not available for the 
first grade students. These children were classified into IQ groups based on scores on the 
vocabulary subtest of the WISC-R, which was administered to all children during the ex- 
perimental session (low M = 74.73, SD = 12.17; high M = 103.62, SD = 12.46). 
Tasks, materials, and procedure. All children were seen individually and administered 
two free-recall tasks in counterbalanced order, separated by a brief interpolated activity 
(digit span). For the sort-recall task, children received two trials on one of two sets of 
black-and-white line drawings from familiar natural language categories (see Table 1). 
Highly familiar and category typical items were selected for this task, so that the children 
might spontaneously use an organizational strategy. Third and fifth grade children were pre- 
sented with 20 items, whereas 16-item lists were used for the first grade children. 
For the sort-recall task, the items from one of the lists were placed on a table in front of 
children in one of two predetermined random orders, with children naming each card as it 
was placed on the table. Children were told that the purpose of the task was to remember 
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TABLE 1 
STIMULUS LISTS USED FOR SORT-RECALL TASK 
List 1 
Fruit: banana,” apple, pear, grapes, cherries 
Furniture: couch,= table, desk, chair, lamp 
Clothing: pants,” coat, socks, dress, gloves 
Tools: wrench,” hammer, drill, axe, pliers 
List 2 
Vehicles: car,O bus, train, airplane, bicycle 
Body parts: leg,” finger, ear, elbow, foot 
Weapons: cannon,“ knife, gun, sword, spear 
Vegetables: carrot,u lettuce, cucumber, corn, celery 
0 Items not included in the lists for the first grade children 
as many of the pictures as they could, and that they would have 2 min to study the cards. 
They were told to sort the pictures into groups of things that go together or are alike in some 
way in preparation of a memory test. Following the 2-min sorting period, the cards were 
covered by a black cloth and children were given a visual match-to-sample task (the Match- 
ing Familiar Figures Test) for 30 s as a buffer-clearing task. Children were then asked to 
recall as many items from the list as they could in any order that they liked. If  a child 
remained silent for 10 s, the experimenter asked if he or she could remember any more 
items. After another 10-s interval or when the child announced that he or she could remem- 
ber no more, the trial was ended. The second sort-recall trial, using the same items pre- 
sented in a different random order, was then begun, following the same procedure as trial 1. 
Children’s sorting was videotaped, and the tapes were later used to determine children’s 
sorting patterns. Before the experimental lists were given to the children, they received a 
six-item practice trial to familiarize them with the sort-recall task. Typically, children’s 
categorization was obvious in that it followed natural language categories as depicted in 
Table 1. Fruits were categorized with fruits, furniture with furniture, and so on. Observation 
and evaluation of the physical sorting was, for the most part, also obvious, with children 
grouping their sorted cards in relatively tight groups with sufficient spaces between the 
sorted groups to indicate group separation. On those few occasions that included some 
ambiguity, the tapes were viewed by no fewer than three evaluators and consensus was 
obtained. 
The class-recall task was administered following the procedures developed by Bjorklund 
and Zeman (1982). Children were first asked the number of children in their current class and 
then asked to remember as many of those children as they could, in any order they wished. 
When 10 s passed without a response, the children were asked if they could remember any 
more names and to think for a few more seconds about the class. After a second 10-s period 
in which no new name was recalled or after children said that they could recall no more 
names, the trial was ended. 
Immediately following class recall, children were asked questions designed to determine 
if they were aware of using any specific strategies in the task. They were first asked how 
they were able to remember so many of their classmates. If  they gave no specific answer 
(e.g., “I don’t know” or “I used my brain”), they were asked if there was any special way 
in which they recalled the names. If  again the answer was negative, they were asked, “Did 
you name the children in any special order?” If  the child described an organizational strat- 
egy in reply to any of the three questions, it was compared to the organizational scheme 
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actually shown in the child’s recall (as reflected by the clustering scores). The entire class- 
recall procedure was audiotaped. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Preliminary analyses of percentage recall, clustering, and sorting scores 
revealed no significant main or interactive effects attributed to sex. 
Therefore, all subsequent analyses will be reported collapsed across sex. 
Also, in most contrasts with class recall, mean performance on the two 
sort-recall trials is used. Recall and clustering were generally higher on 
the second sort-recall trial than the first, but the pattern with respect to 
class recall was statistically identical for each trial. For all analyses, re- 
sults are reported at p < .05 and significant effects were assessed via 
Neumann-Keuls tests unless otherwise specified. 
Recall 
Percentage recall was analyzed in a 3 (grade: first, third, fifth) x 2 (IQ 
group: high, low) x 2 (task: class recall, mean sort recall) analysis of 
variance, with repeated measures on the task factor. These data are 
shown in Table 2. As can be seen, level of performance was relatively 
high for children at each grade level for both the class-recall and sort- 
recall tasks. The analysis produced significant main effects of grade, 
F(2,147) = 33.66, MS, = 213.91 [fifth (83.86%) = third (80.04%) > first 
(67.6%)]; IQ group, F(1,147) = 9.3 [high (80.03%) > low (75.34%)]; and 
task, F( 1,147) = 22.63, MS, = 127.69 [sort recall (80.58%) > class recall 
(74.45%)]. Also significant were the grade x task, F(2,147) = 3.30, and 
IQ group x task, F(1,147) = 9.16, interactions. 
Inspection of the significant grade x task interaction revealed that re- 
call on sort recall was significantly greater than on class recall for both the 
third and fifth graders, ts(147) 2 3.76, (84.17% vs 75.91% for the third 
graders and 88.03% vs 79.69% for the fifth graders). This difference was 
not significant for the first grade children (68.22% vs 66.98%, t(147) < 1). 
The IQ group x task was the critical interaction for the purposes of this 
study. As predicted, there was no difference in percentage recall between 
the high-IQ (74.96%) and low-IQ (74.01%) groups for the class-recall task, 
t(294) < 1. In contrast, the high-IQ children recalled significantly more 
items than the low-IQ children on the sort-recall task (85.1% vs 76.67%, 
t(294) = 3.99). 
Clustering 
The Adjusted Ratio of Clustering (ARC) score (Roenker, Thompson, & 
Brown, 1971) was used as a measure of clustering in recall for the class- 
recall task. Perfect clustering is set at an ARC score of 1 .O, chance clus- 
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TABLE 2 
MEAN PERCENTAGE RECALL AND CLUSTERING BY GRADE, IQ LEVEL, AND TASK 
High IQ Low IQ 
First grade 
Sort Recall 
Class Recall 
74.3 (.7l) 62.4 (.56) 
[l&91 [15.11 
66.4 C-39) 67.5 (Sl) 
[18.51 [l5.6] 
Third grade 
Sort Recall 88.6 t.90) 80.6 (.85) 
lg.91 [11.81 
Class Recall 75.5 (.43) 76.3 (52) 
[ll.l] [l5.01 
Fifth grade 
Sort Recall 91.9 (.9l) 84.7 (.90) 
L7.51 L9.91 
Class Recall 82.6 (.61) 77.2 (.56) 
L9.81 l9.81 
Nore. ARC scores are in parentheses. Standard deviations are in brackets. 
tering is set at 0, and negative values represent clustering less than ex- 
pected by chance.’ As in previous work (e.g., Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982, 
1983), clustering for class recall was computed based on several possible 
organizations (i.e., reading groups, seating groups, sex, race, etc.) with a 
child’s highest ARC score being used in all subsequent analyses. The 
categories used to determine the ARC scores in class recall were prede- 
termined, based on structures present in the classrooms (e.g., seating 
arrangements, reading groups), characteristics of the children (e.g., sex, 
’ The ARC score was chosen as a measure of clustering because it possesses certain 
features desirable when comparisons of organization are to be made among lists of varying 
lengths and over conditions where recall is expected to differ (e.g., item recall vs. class 
recall). First of all, the ARC score has been found to vary independently of level of recall 
(Murphy, 1979). That is, unlike some other indices, high levels of recall do not in and of 
themselves produce high levels of organization. Furthermore, ARC scores do not system- 
atically vary with the number of categories presented in a list. That is, the ARC scores will 
not necessarily be higher when a “list” consists of only two or three categories than when 
the same list is divided into five or more categories. Thus, we can make comparisons of 
organization between children who organize their class recall by sex (two categories) with 
those who organize on the basis of reading groups (five or six categories), knowing that 
levels of organization will be independent of the number of possible categories in the lists. 
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race), and other information provided to us by each teacher (e.g., groups 
of friends, transportation groups). 
Mean clustering (ARC) scores are presented by grade, IQ group, and 
task in Table 2. Clustering in sort recall was based on the groups each 
child had made during the sorting phase of the experiment. A child’s mean 
clustering on the two sort-recall trials was used in the following analyses 
for the sort-recall data. 
The analysis of the clustering data produced significant main effects of 
grade, F(2,147) = 20.05, MS, = .052 [fifth (.74) = third (.67) > first 
(.54)], and task, F(1,147) = 191.92, MS, = .037 [sort recall (.81) > class 
recall (.50)]. Also significant were all interactions involving task: grade x 
task, F(2,147) = 8.47; IQ group x task, F(1,147) = 7.6; and grade x IQ 
group x task, F(2,147) = 3.81. An inspection of the significant three-way 
interaction revealed no differences in clustering between the high- and 
low-IQ groups at any grade for class recall. For the sort-recall task, clus- 
tering was significantly greater for the high-IQ group than the low-IQ 
group only for the first graders, t(294) = 2.45. The lack of difference 
between the two IQ groups for the sort-recall task for the third and fifth 
grade children can be attributed to ceiling levels of clustering perfor- 
mance. As can be seen from Table 2, clustering on sort recall was uni- 
formly high for the third and fifth graders, reflecting these subjects’ ef- 
fective use of a categorical strategy to mediate their recall performance. 
Although clustering in class recall was also high relative to that typically 
found in free-recall tasks, it did not approach ceiling levels. 
Organization at Sorting 
The extent to which subjects organized their groups according to adult- 
defined categories’ was evaluated for the two sort-recall trials by com- 
puting ARC scores that assessed the composition of children’s sorts as a 
function of adult categories (hereafter referred to as sorting). Children of 
all grades easily sorted items according to the adult criteria (mean sorting 
per grade: first = .76; third = .98; fifth = .95). A grade x IQ group x trial 
analysis of variance, performed on the sort-recall data, produced signif- 
icant effects of grade, F(2,147) = 15.39, MS, = .08 (fifth = third > first), 
and IQ group, F(1,147) = 4.80 [high IQ (M = .94) > low IQ (M = .86)]. 
There were no other significant effects in the analysis of the sorting 
data. 
* Adult-defined categories are those natural language categories that define, in a single 
word or phrase, various typical or common items. Table 1 contains the sort-recall task 
categories and their contents. 
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TABLE 3 
CORRELATIONS OF RECALL, CLUSTERING, AND SORTING WITH IQ FOR CLASS RECALL 
AND TRIALS 1 AND 2 OF SORT RECALL 
Recall Clustering Sorting 
First grade (n = 46) 
Class recall 
Sort recall 1 
Sort recall 2 
.04 -.13 
.39* .I8 .32* 
.42* .26* .I1 
Third grade (n = 54) 
Class recall 
Sort recall 1 
Sort recall 2 
.I2 - .24* 
.27+ .17 .20 
.53* .06 .I9 
Fifth grade (n = 52) 
Class recall 
Sort recall 1 
Sort recall 2 
* p < .05. 
.18 .09 
.27* .07 .08 
.20 .18 -.05 
Correlations of Recall, Clustering, and Sorting with I@ 
Table 3 presents correlations of recall, clustering, and sorting with IQ, 
separately for the class-recall and sort-recall tasks (note that correlations 
with sorting scores were available only on the sort-recall task). As can be 
seen, there were no significant positive correlations between IQ and recall 
or clustering at any grade level for the class-recall task. The only signif- 
icant correlation between class-recall performance and IQ was a negative 
one for clustering of the third graders. In contrast, significant correlations 
with recall on the sort-recall task were found in five of six possible in- 
stances. There was only one significant correlation between clustering 
and IQ for the sort-recall task, and that was for the first graders on trial 
2. As we mentioned before, clustering in recall was at ceiling levels for the 
two groups of older children, attenuating any correlational effect. A sim- 
ilar pattern was observed between IQ and sorting on the sort-recall task, 
with a significant correlation being found only for the first graders (trial 1). 
Correlations were also computed between the recall and clustering 
scores. It was assumed that if levels of recall are mediated by strategic 
organization, then the correlation between recall and clustering measures 
3 Because near-ceiling level performance by the older children on some of the measures 
could attenuate correlations calculated from raw scores, both Spearman rank-order corre- 
lations and Pearson correlations were computed for each comparison. Patterns of correla- 
tions were nearly identical for every comparison; therefore, only Pearson correlation values 
are reported. 
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would be significant and high (cf. Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985; Frankel & 
Rollins, 1982; Jablonski, 1974). The correlations between recall and clus- 
tering in class recall were negative and nonsignificant at each grade level 
(TS = - .17, - .08, and - .21 for the first, third, and fifth graders, respec- 
tively). In contrast, the correlations between recall and clustering were 
significant (p < .OS) in three out of six comparisons for the sort-recall task 
[first grade: trial 1 = .30, trial 2 = .39; fifth grade, trial 1 = .29; the 
correlations were not significant for the third graders on trials 1 (r = .17) 
and 2 (r = .07), or for the fifth graders on trial 2 (u = .OS)]. Again, the 
ceiling level clustering scores for the third and fifth graders attenuated 
correlations with recall. 
Children’s Awareness of Strategies in Class Recall 
Following the completion of class recall, children were asked if they 
had remembered their classmates’ names in any special order or way. 
Children who professed a strategy consistent with that observed (i.e., one 
that corresponded to their highest ARC score) were classified as Consis- 
tent. Representative examples of strategies that children professed in- 
cluded seating arrangement (“Looking at tables in my head,” “I pictured 
the room and where everybody sits”), alphabetical (“I thought of the roll 
call and the names on it”), or activity groups (“I thought of the kids in my 
math/reading/spelling group”). Other explanations children gave about 
how they remembered their classmates’ names could not be evaluated. 
These included statements such as “Thinking,” “I talk to them every- 
day,” or “I just know them.” 
Those who professed either no strategy or one inconsistent with that 
observed in their recall were classified as Not Consistent. A typical ex- 
ample of an inconsistent strategy response would be a child who pro- 
fessed to using the teacher’s roll call to remember his or her classmates, 
but actually recalled them (as reflected by ARC scores) according to 
reading groups (and the roll call was not in reading group order). As in 
previous work (Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982), the majority of children at 
each grade level were classified as Not Consistent, although the first 
graders were slightly more likely to be so classified than the older children 
(percent classified as Not Consistent = 77, 56, and 62% for the first, 
third, and fifth graders, respectively, x2 (2) = 5.05, p = .08). Low-IQ 
subjects were equally likely to be classified as Consistent (36%) as were 
high-IQ subjects (420/o), x2 (1) < 1 .4 
4 As in earlier class-recall studies, children who were classified as Consistent had higher 
recall and clustering scores than those of children who were classified as Not Consistent, 
although the absolute levels of performance for the Not Consistent subjects were high in an 
absolute sense (mean recall, Not Consistent subjects: 71%; mean clustering: .47). 
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DISCUSSION 
In this study, high- and low-IQ children’s free recall of familiar infor- 
mation was tested in a class-recall task and a sort-recall task. The sort- 
recall task was chosen because of its significant strategic (i.e., effortful) 
component and because it was predicted to produce levels of performance 
comparable to those of class recall. In fact, both levels of recall and 
clustering were significantly greater for the sort-recall than those for the 
class-recall task, with clustering being at ceiling levels of performance for 
sort recall for the third and fifth grade children. Although such high levels 
of performance were not predicted, they were not entirely unexpected. 
Past research has shown that children will use a sophisticated organiza- 
tional strategy in a sort-recall task when they are familiar with the items 
and their categorical relations and are instructed to sort items into mean- 
ingful groups prior to recall (e.g., Corsale & Ornstein, 1980). 
Despite the high levels of recall and clustering for children on the sort- 
recall task, levels of performance differed as a function of intelligence. 
High-IQ children recalled more words on the sort-recall task than low-IQ 
children at all grade levels. A similar pattern was observed for clustering 
for the first graders, the only grade for which clustering in sort recall was 
not at ceiling levels. Correlational analyses confirmed the experimental 
results, with no significant positive correlations being found between per- 
formance measures and IQ for class recall, with five of six correlations 
between recall and IQ being significant for the sort-recall task. Ceiling 
performance on the sort-recall task for the third and fifth graders made the 
correlational pattern for clustering and sorting for these children uninter- 
pretable. Correlations between IQ and clustering and sorting were signif- 
icant, however, for the first graders, who did not approach ceiling levels 
on these measures. 
When children are expert in a specific domain, they remember infor- 
mation from that domain well, with levels of performance being indepen- 
dent of individual differences in intelligence (Recht & Leslie, 1988; 
Schneider et al., 1989; Walker, 1987). This finding was replicated in the 
current experiment. The major difference between this study and previ- 
ous expert/novice experiments examining levels of performance as a func- 
tion of intelligence is that motivation to become an expert was not an 
issue here. Unlike children who become experts in chess, baseball, or 
soccer, all children, by the end of the school year, are experts with re- 
spect to the composition of their current school class, with no special 
motivation required to attain this expertise. Thus, the results of this ex- 
periment, and by inference the findings of other expert/novice studies, 
can be attributed to expert children’s greater knowledge of the to-be- 
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remembered information and not to differential motivation to perform 
well in their area of specialization. 
In previous research, we have found that soccer experts are not only 
more knowledgeable about soccer than novices, but also more interested 
in the topic and more highly motivated to perform tasks involving soccer. 
Although it seems likely that motivation and interest may be reasons for 
the superior performance of experts versus novices on tasks involving 
experts’ areas of proficiency, these factors do not seem to be responsible 
for patterns of performance found for high- and low-aptitude experts. For 
example, in a study by Schneider and Bjorklund (1992) in which soccer- 
expert children performed a sort-recall task with soccer-related items, 
there was no difference in interest in soccer between high- and low-IQ 
experts. Likewise, in the present study, motivation to become an expert 
was eliminated, yet patterns of performance between the high- and low- 
IQ children were comparable to that found in other expert/novice studies. 
Thus, although motivation may play an important role in overall levels of 
performance, it is not responsible for the patterns observed when high- 
and low-aptitude children serve as subjects. Rather, the knowledge that 
these experts have, independent of intelligence, seems to be the critical 
factor in influencing cognitive task performance. 
How does being an expert in a domain facilitate processing of domain- 
relevant information, to the extent that expertise can compensate for 
individual differences in intelligence? It has been proposed that having 
detailed knowledge for a domain results in more efficient (i.e., faster) 
information processing, which affords the individual more mental re- 
sources to allocate to various aspects of the task at hand (e.g., Bjorklund, 
1987; Bjorklund et al., 1990). This improved efficiency can result in more 
resources being used for the execution of strategies or in the increased 
automatization of processes, without the need of deliberate, effortful 
strategies. In the present experiment, the benefits of expertise were 
mainly astrategic. As we discussed in the Introduction, performance in 
class recall has been hypothesized to be mediated by the relatively auto- 
matic activation of relations in long-term memory, with deliberate strat- 
egies providing little additional benefit to performance (Bjorklund & 
Bjorklund, 1985). A majority of children at each grade level were classi- 
fied as Not Consistent on the class-recall task (i.e., they did not describe 
an organizational strategy consistent with one observed in their recall), 
confirming the nonstrategic way in which children performed the task. 
Yet, levels of performance were nonetheless high. Children classified as 
Consistent did show a significant recall advantage in class recall (10%) 
relative to children classified as Not Consistent, but the recall of this 
latter group was still high in absolute terms (71%). 
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Moreover, the correlations between recall and clustering were nonsig- 
nificant for class recall (in fact, these correlations were negative at each 
grade level). Positive correlations between recall and clustering have been 
interpreted as reflecting the use of a deliberate organizational strategy 
(Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985; Frankel & Rollins, 1982; Schneider, 1986), 
with nonsignificant correlations reflecting the fact that performance is 
mediated by nonstrategic factors. In contrast to class recall, the correla- 
tions between recall and clustering were significant for both sort-recall 
trials for the first graders. Again, ceiling levels of clustering precluded 
interpreting correlations between recall and ARC scores for the third and 
fifth graders, but even so, this correlation was significant for the fifth 
graders on trial 1. 
The class-recall task differs from the sort-recall task in ways other than 
the expertise of the children for the to-be-remembered information. For 
example, although both tasks require deliberate retrieval of information, 
the sort-recall task involves a study period, where sets of familiar items 
must be learned. There is no comparable study period for class recall, 
with children merely being asked to recall items from long-term memory. 
The contrast of importance between the two tasks, then, may be the 
nature of acquisition, and not expertise, per se. Although we cannot rule 
out this possibility, we believe that expertise is the more critical factor. 
For example, patterns of performance for the class-recall task are similar 
to those found for more conventional areas of expertise (e.g., soccer or 
baseball), with minimal age differences being observed (e.g., Schneider et 
al., 1989), and no significant relationship being found between levels of 
performance and intelligence (e.g., Recht & Leslie, 1988; Schneider et 
al., 1989; Walker, 1987). 
A more critical difference between the class-recall and sort-recall tasks, 
we believe, is the fact that performance on class recall is primarily me- 
diated by nonstrategic factors (cf. Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982), whereas 
performance on sort recall is greatly facilitated by deliberate strategies 
(see Bjorklund & Muir, 1988; Schneider & Pressley, 1989). Previous stud- 
ies finding no relation between task performance and intelligence for ex- 
perts dealing with information from their area of expertise have also used 
tasks that, in general, do not involve deliberate strategies (i.e., memory 
span, text processing). Thus, one reason for the different patterns be- 
tween experts and novices in other studies (e.g., Schneider et al., 1989) 
and between class recall and sort recall in this study, may be the degree 
to which deliberate strategies are necessary for successful task solution. 
However, the results of the present study are similar to those reported in 
other studies of expertise, all of which used tasks that rely minimally on 
deliberate, conscious strategies. In sum, the findings of this study illus- 
trate that the memory advantages of a detailed knowledge base can com- 
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pensate for individual differences in intelligence, and that these effects are 
not a function of the special motivation that is often associated with being 
an expert. 
REFERENCES 
BJORKLUND, D. F. (1987). How age changes in knowledge base contribute to the develop- 
ment of children’s memory: An interpretive review. Developmental Review, 7, 93-130. 
BJORKLUND, D. F., & BJORKLUND, B. R. (1985). Organization versus item effects of an 
elaborated knowledge base on children’s memory. Developmental Psychology, 21, 
1120-1131. 
BJORKLUND, D. F., & JACOBS, .I. W. (1985). Associative and categorical processes in chil- 
dren’s memory: The role of automaticity in the development of organization in free 
recall. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 39, 599-617. 
BJORKLUND, D. F., & MUIR, J. E. (1988). Children’s development of free recall memory: 
Remembering on their own. In R. Vasta (Ed.), Annals of child development (Vol. 5, pp. 
79-123). Greenwich, CN: JAI. 
BJORKLUND, D. F., MUIR-BROADDUS, J. E., & SCHNEIDER, W. (1990). The role of knowl- 
edge in the development of children’s strategies. In D. F. Bjorklund (Ed.), Children’s 
strategies: Contemporary views of cognitive development (pp. 93-128). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
BJORKLUND, D. F., & ZEMAN, B. R. (1982). Children’s organization and metamemory 
awareness in their recall of familiar information. Child Development, 53, 799-810. 
BJORKLUND, D. F., & ZEMAN, B. R. (1983). The development of organizational strategies 
in children’s recall of familiar information: Using social organization to recall the names 
of classmates. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 6, 341-353. 
CECI, S. J. (1990). On intelligence . . more or less: A bio-ecological treatise on intellectual 
development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
CHI, M. T. H. (1978). Knowledge structure and memory development. In R. Siegler (Ed.), 
Children’s thinking: What develops? (pp. 73-96). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
CHI, M. T. H. (1985). Interactive roles of knowledge and strategies in the development of 
organized sorting and recall. In S. F. Chipman, J. W. Segal, & R. Glaser (Eds.), Think- 
ing and learning skills: Vol. 2. Research and open questions. (pp. 457483). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
CORSALE, K., & ORNSTEIN, P. A. (1980). Developmental changes in children’s use of se- 
mantic information in recall. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 30, 231-245. 
FRANKEL, M. T., & ROLLINS, H. A. (1982). Age-related differences in clustering: A new 
approach. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 34, 113-122. 
HASHER, L., & ZACKS, R. (1979). Automatic and effortful processes in memory. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 356-388. 
JABLONSKI, E. M. (1974). Free recall in children. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 522-539. 
KUNZINGER, E. L., & WITRYOL, S. L. (1984). The effects of differential incentives on 
second-grade rehearsal and free recall. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 144, 19-30. 
MUIR-BROADDUS, J. E., & BJORKLUND, D. F. (1990). Developmental and individual differ- 
ences in children’s memory strategies: The role of knowledge. In W. Schneider & F. E. 
Weinert (Eds.), Interactions among strategies, knowledge, and aptitudes in cognitive 
performance (pp. 99-l 16). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
MURPHY, M. D. (1979). Measurement of category clustering in free recall. In C. R. Puff 
(Ed.), Memory organization and structure (pp. 99-128). New York: Academic Press. 
OPWIS, K., GOLD, A., GRUBER, H., & SCHNEIDER, W. (1990). Zum Einfluss von Expertise 
auf Gedachtnisleistungen und ihre Selbsteinschatzung bei Kindem und Erwachsenen 
(The impact of expertise on memory performance and performance prediction in chil- 
IQ AND EXPERTISE 355 
dren and adults). Zeitschrift fir Entwicklungspsychologie und Padagogische Psychol- 
ogie, 21, 207-224. 
ORNSTEIN, P. A., BAKER-WARD, L., & NAUS, M. J. (1988). The development of mnemonic 
skill. In F. E. Weinert & M. Perlmutter (Eds.), Memory development: Universal 
changes and individual differences (pp. 31-50). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
RECHT, D. R., & LESLIE, L. (1988). Effect of prior knowledge on good and poor reader’s 
memory for text. Journal of Educational Psychology, 80, 16-20. 
ROENKER, D. L., THOMPSON, C. P., & BROWN, S. C. (1971). Comparison of measures for 
the estimation of clustering in free recall. Psychological Bulletin, 76, 4548. 
SCHNEIDER, W. (1986). The role of conceptual knowledge and metamemory in the devel- 
opment of organizational processes in memory. Journal of Experimental Child Psychol- 
ogy, 42, 218-236. 
SCHNEIDER, W., & BJORKLUND, D. F. (1992). Expertise, aptitude, and strategic remem- 
bering. Child Development, 63, 461473. 
SCHNEIDER, W., K~RKEL, J., & WEINERT, F. E. (1989). Domain-specific knowledge and 
memory performance: A comparison of high- and low-aptitude children. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 81, 306-312. 
SCHNEIDER, W., & K~RKEL, J., & WEINERT, F. E. (1990). Expert knowledge, general 
abilities, and text processing. In W. Schneider & F. E. Weinert (Eds.), Interactions 
among aptitude, strategies, and knowledge in cognitive performance (pp. 235-251). 
New York: Springer-Verlag. 
SCHNEIDER, W., & PRESSLEY, M. (1989). Memory development between 2 and 20. New 
York: Springer-Verlag. 
STERNBERG, R. J. (1985). Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
SWANSON, H. L. (1990). Influence of metacognitive knowledge and aptitude on problem 
solving. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 306-314. 
Voss, J. F., VESONDER, G. T., & SPILICH, G. J. (1980). Text generation and recall by 
high-knowledge and low-knowledge individuals. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, 19, 651-667. 
WALKER, C. H. (1987). Relative importance of domain knowledge and overall aptitude on 
acquisition of domain-related information. Cognition and Instruction, 4, 25-12. 
